University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1995

Judicial Biography
Richard A. Posner

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard A. Posner, "Judicial Biography," 70 New York University Law Review 502 (1995).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY
RICHARD

A. POSNER*

Biography is an old (older than Plutarch, conventionally regarded
father of the genre), rich, various, immensely popular, and
the
as
philosophically controversial genre. Judicial biography is a newish,
growing, increasingly popular, and-I think-highly problematic subgenre of biography and of legal scholarship. As the first speaker at a
conference on judicial biography I consider it appropriate to take a
broad, general view of the topic. It will aid in this endeavor if I begin
with some remarks about biography in general and literary biography-which, as I shall explain, judicial biography resembles-in
particular.
I
One cannot speak intelligently about biography without considering its aims, and, as these are various, "biography" is not a homogeneous category of writing. Some biographies use a person's life as a
scaffold on which to hang a narrative of historical events that the person participated in or observed, or as a skeleton for supporting a selection of letters or other previously unpublished documents. These
biographies are the least interesting so far as analysis or critique of
biography as a distinct genre is concerned. A closely related but more
interesting subgenre of biography uses the subject's life as a window
on the past and could be considered a branch of history.
Many biographies cater to our curiosity (often, though not always, prurient) about other people's lives, especially famous people's
(Suetonius and Procopius are the pioneers here). These biographies
are not very interesting, either, from an analytical standpoint, though
Professor Grey's comment' persuades me that I should not write off
this subgenre-biography as "vicarious acquaintanceship," one might
call it-too quickly. It is related to the interest (which I have de* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago. A.B., 1959, Yale University; LL.B., 1962, Harvard
University. This is a revised version of a paper given at the National Conference on Judicial Biography held at New York University School of Law on May 5-6, 1995. I thank
Robert Ferguson, Dennis Hutchinson, Philip Kurland, Martha Nussbaum, Cass Sunsten,
and the participants in the conference (especially the three commentators on my paper) for
their many helpful criticisms of the original draft.
1 See Thomas C. Grey, Commentary, Unrepeatable Lessons, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 524,
525-26 (1995).

502
HeinOnline -- 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 502 1995

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

June 1995]

OBJECTIVITY AND HAGIOGRAPHY

fended 2) in gossip and more broadly to the possibility of acquiring
valuable insights by reading about people as well as by getting to
know them in person.
Some biographies tell an exciting story; Symons's The Quest for
Corvo3 is an example. Some are critical, debunking, like Strachey's
Eminent Victorians,4 and many are hagiographical, like the original
lives of the saints-"hagiography" means writing about saints;5 I shall
call both these sorts of biography ideological, without however intending the word to be given its usual, faintly pejorative connotation.
Some biographies are edifying: they are designed to provide models
or antimodels for the reader's own life. A famous example is Cecil's
life of Melbourne.6 Many feminist biographies are of this character.
Some biographies aim at answering specific questions, often of a
causal nature: Why did X do Y, or where did X get the idea for Y, or
was X really the author of Y, or, most commonly, why was X a great
writer, leader, whatever? Let me call these scientific biographies.
Psychobiography is an illustration; it seeks to identify psychological
causes of people's beliefs and actions. Finally, the most common aim
of "great" biography and of biography that aspires to greatness is to
reveal the "inner man" (or woman), the essential self-what Walt
Whitman called "the Me myself" 7 and Leon Edel "the private selfconcept that guides a given life" or equivalently the "concealed self."8
I shall call biographies dominated by this aim essentialist biographies,
as they posit an essential self. Obviously I am not using the word in its
nornial philosophical sense.
The aims identified by this description of biographical genres are
not mutually exclusive, and therefore more than one of them may be
found in the same biography. The most common aims of judicial biography, other than that of providing a scaffold for discussing an area of
law, or a legal institution (usually the Supreme Court), or the history
of a legal institution, have been ideological and essentialist, though
some have had, or at least can be imputed to have had, other aimsSee Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 238-40 (1981).
AJ.A.Symons, The Quest for Corvo: An Experiment in Biography (1934).
4 Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians: Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr.
Arnold, General Gordon (1918).
5 Illustrations from judicial biography are legion. See, e.g., Frank Sikora, The Judge:
The Life & Opinions of Alabama's Frank M. Johnson, Jr. (1992).
6 David Cecil, Melbourne (1954).
7 Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, in Leaves of Grass 28,32 (Harold W. Blodgett et al.
eds., New York Univ. Press 1965) (1891-92).
8 Leon Edel, Keynote Address: Biography and the Science of Man, in New Directions
in Biography 1, 9, 10 (Anthony M. Friedson ed., 1981); see also Elisabeth Young-Bruehl,
The Writing of Biography, 50 Partisan Rev. 413, 413 (1983).
2
3
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instead, or as well-such as edification, vicarious acquaintanceship, or
causal explanation (what made Judge X great?; or decide cases the
way he did?). Both the ideological and the essentialist biography are
beset by profound epistemological problems; that is to say, they have
an uneasy relation with truth. The ideological biography presupposes
some ideal with which to compare and by which to measure the individual who is its subject, and often it will be difficult to justify the ideal
to doubters, to show that it is a worthy ideal. This is a serious problem
of judicial biography, as we shall see. A related problem of ideological biographies, and again one that commonly afflicts judicial biography, is that in order to sharpen the comparison between his subject
and the ideal the biographer will be sorely tempted to prune the
"nonessential" features of his subject-the good features if the biographer wishes to debunk him for his failure to come up to the ideal, the
bad features if the biographer wishes to present the subject as an exemplar of the ideal. For the subject in these biographies is not an end
in itself but an instrument to the exposition of an ideal, and the
sharper and cleaner the instrument the more effective it is to this end.
The essentialist biographer encounters epistemological difficulties
of a different kind. He is in search of the essential self of his subject.
Invariably that essential self is assumed to be coherent, 9 a unity of
some kind; if it is a disorderly aggregation of conflicting elements, the
biographer and his readers will not be satisfied that the biography has
penetrated beneath the surface. In the implicit psychology employed
by essentialist biographers, every human being has three layers of personality. The first consists of the constructed self-the face we present to the world in an effort to facilitate our transactions, whether
commercial or personal, with other people. Below is a second self,
consisting of those aspects of personality that we conceal from most or
all other people. Which of these selves is the more authentic is a deep,
and I think unanswerable, question. 10 Below the second self is-or so
at least the essentialist assumes; it is the indispensable assumption of
his project-the essential self, the one that generates the two higher
levels, that holds the key to the person and his works, that enables the
biographer to describe particular aspects of the subject as "uncharacteristic," discordant, anomalous. The essential self, too, is a
constructed self, though constructed by the biographer rather than by
his subject. Is it a construct that captures, that recreates, a reality? Is
it, in short, a hypothesis, and, if so, is it testable? Or is it a fiction,
which "makes sense" of the subject in the way that avowed fiction
9 See Ira B. Nadel, Biography: Fiction, Fact and Form 8-10, 154-56 (1984).

10 See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 531-51 (1995).

HeinOnline -- 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 504 1995

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

June 1995]

OBJECTIVITY AND HAGIOGRAPHY

seeks to make human action coherent, intelligible, plausible,
probable?"
My own view, based partly on introspection and partly on observation of other people, is that the "essential self" is a fiction. 12 People
are confusing mixtures, both over time' 3 and at the same time. I do
not mean that they are irrational in the sense of behaving inconsistently or even foolishly. I mean only that their preferences, values,
reactions, and traits of character and personality are not reducible to
an easily grasped, coherently organized, essence-the "saint," the
"villain," the "weak man," the "designing woman," the "genius," the
"hero," and so forth. There is no inconsistency, no "irrationality," in
having preferences that do not compose an aesthetically or emotionally pleasing unity-no inconsistency, therefore, in being a brilliant
writer and a vicious anti-Semite, a brilliant doctor and a child molester, a daring warrior and an acrophobe, a lover of hairshirts and of
caviar. Aristotle famously distinguished in the Poetics between history and imaginative literature on the ground that the former dealt
with the actual in all its confusing particularity and the latter with the
probable, making poetry "something more philosophic and of graver
import than history." 14 Characters in fiction have a unity, a coherence
and hence intelligibility, that is missing from real life (not all fictional
characters: just think of Hamlet). We are constantly being fooled
about real people; they don't conform to the models we construct of
them. Writers borrow generously from real life, but in recasting the
people they know into fictional characters, the complexities of those
people are downplayed, and a dominant trait is allowed to swallow the
other traits of the real-life model. (It is a particular distinction of
Joyce and Proust that they do not do this.) Most fictional characters
are more like the medieval "humors" than they are like people you
actually encounter. The essentialist biographer fictionalizes his subject. The novel and the essentialist biography are related genres.
I may be wrong in my skepticism about the existence within each
of us of an "essential self." My evidence is weak. Reliance on introspection will be particularly derided, and not only by Freudians. I
may be exaggerating the difference between scientific and essentialist
11 The danger of exaggerating the unity of the self in the writing of biography is noted
in Richard H. Blum, Psychological Processes in Preparing Contemporary Biography, 4 Biography 293, 301-03 (1981).
12 Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 Harv. L

Rev. 959, 965-68 (1992). See generally The Self in Social Psychology (Daniel M. Wegner &
Robin R. Vallacher eds., 1980).
13 1 emphasize this idea in Richard A. Posner, Aging and Old Age (forthcoming 1995).
14 Aristotle, Poetics, in 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle 2316, 2323 (Jonathan
Barnes ed., 1984).
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biography, both of which could be thought engaged in the common
project of inference from data to the best explanation of the data. But
even if I am wrong about the nonexistence of an essential self, essentialist biography has the embarrassing property of making truth claims
that cannot be verified. When the biographer proposes an essential
self for his subject, there is no technique for comparing the proposal
to the "real" essential self to determine whether the biographer has
actually discovered that true self. Nor is there any other method of
verifying that the biographer is "right." Whenever truth claims cannot
be verified, the claims themselves are likely to be influenced by wishful thinking generated by the claimant's, in this case the biographer's,
own traits and values; this turns out to be a serious problem for judicial biography. The problem of unverifiability also attends what I am
calling the "scientific" biography. It is a general problem with attributions of causality to historical events, and biography is in one sense a
branch of history. To say that Napoleon caused the diffusion of the
ideas of the French Revolution throughout Europe is to hypothesize
that had there been no Napoleon those ideas would have diffused
more slowly or perhaps not at all. That is a counterfactual impossible
to verify through experimental or statistical methods.
Both history and biography are plagued by the hindsight problem. We know how things turned out, how a life turned out. We have
no direct knowledge of how they would have turned out if something
had been different, say in the subject's upbringing. The tendency to
see the climactic events or crowning achievements of a life as latent in
a person's character or early life is well-nigh irresistible, though we
have no way of knowing whether things would have turned out differently had the person had a different character or different life experiences. Biography is often, perhaps characteristically, the telling of a
plausible story of how the events of a person's life might have been
causally related to each other and (as both cause and effect) to earlier
and later perturbations in the social environment. These stories may
be interesting and edifying, but their accuracy cannot be verified. The
most honest biography would be the one written contemporaneously
with the life being lived by its subject, so that the biographer would
not know how that life was going to turn out until he had finished the
biography.
Another problem of biography, one closely related to the epistemological, may be called the problem of inconsequence or disconnection. Even if each of us has an essential self discoverable by an
empathetic biographer, it is far from clear that the essential self generates whatever it is about the subject of the biography that interests us.
The deepest layer of personality must be connected with something in
HeinOnline -- 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 506 1995
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the more visible layers, if the former is a responsible (even if unverifiable) inference from the latter, but it may not be connected with the
individual's aptitudes or achievements. This point is obscured in the
case of biographies of men of action because the interest is mainly in
the actions, and they are visible. It is conspicuous in the case of literary biographies and other biographies of men or women of thought.
We might learn about Napoleon's campaigns by reading a biography
of Napoleon. But we would be unlikely to read a biography of Joyce
without some previous acquaintance with his writings, and our main
curiosity in reading the biography would be about the source of his
genius. And here we would be disappointed. We might learn why he
was so strange, but we would not learn why he was a great writer or
what his works mean. We learn from modem biographies of T.E.
Lawrence that he derived sexual pleasure from being whipped and
apparently from nothing else;' 5 the connection between his somewhat
unusual sexual taste and his achievements as soldier, writer, translator, statesman, and self-promoter remains wholly obscure, and my
surmise is that there is none.
The principal lesson that I take from the best, the most thorough,
the most impartial modem biographies about creative people whether
in the arts or sciences is precisely that of the disconnection of achievement from self. I am not alone in drawing that lesson. "Whenever a
writer, artist, musician, any man of imagination is made the subject of
a biography, his light may be extinguished.... [L]ife is simply a shell,
the kernel of which is creative work. There is no real nourishment in
biography. The words fly up, the lives remain below. 16 I have known
a number of brilliant, creative people and read about many more, and
the curious thing is how rarely the brilliance, the creativity, is diffused
throughout the individual's personality. Brilliant natural and social
scientists tend to be ordinary people with a few highly developed, esoteric, invisible (by their fruits only shall ye know them), and impacted
intellectual skills, while brilliant creative people in the arts and humanities tend to be psychologically disturbed people with a few highly
developed, esoteric, invisible, and impacted artistic skills. The spark
15 See Malcolm Brown & Julia Cave, A Touch of Genius: The Life of T.E. Lawrence
22, 174, 177, 184 (1988).
16 Michael Holroyd, Literary and Historical Biography, in New Directions in Biography, supra note 8, at 12, 18. As Aldous Huxley put it, the biographer has the Midas

touch-but in reverse. This point is made with specific reference to d. Edward White's
effort to expose Oliver Wendell Holmes's "inner self" in Evans WVohlforth, The "Essential"

Holmes, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 441,443-47 (1994) (reviewing G. Edward White, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self (1993)). And here is another pertinent maxim of

Huxley's: To like a writer and want to meet him is the equivalent of liking patd de foie gras
and wanting to meet the goose.
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of genius eludes the biographer's grasp. Generally all the reader of
the biography of a creative person discovers so far as the springs of
genius are concerned is what should have been obvious all along: that
highly successful people in any field tend to take their work very seriously, at least while they are doing it, however reckless or frivolous
the rest of their life may be, and that outside their (often very narrow)
area of achievement creative people are just like ordinary people.
it all," as Auden said in his
"You were silly like us: your gift survived
17
Yeats.
Butler
William
to
ode
funeral
I do not want to exaggerate the disconnection thesis. Obviously
the fact that Joyce grew up in Dublin is related to the setting of
Ulysses, and the fact that Napoleon became an officer at a time when
the established military and political hierarchies had been destroyed is
related, along with luck, to his rapid rise to power. And it is a reasonable guess that intelligence and energy are preconditions for most
forms of admired achievement; again we could illustrate with
Napoleon and Joyce. But we know these things without the aid of
essentialist or scientific biography. The literary biography in particular seems somehow to miss the point, to illustrate the old joke about
the man who searched for his keys not where he had dropped them
but where the light from the street lamp made a search possible, and
to support the New Critics' distrust of biographical literary criticism.18
So the writing of biography, or of the interesting kinds of biography at any rate, is an epistemologically problematic endeavor. It is
also very costly. Biographies of people who have been dead for a long
time are labor-intensive, like works of outright history, because it
takes a lot of digging in musty archives to make even a plausible reconstruction of the past. Biographies of the recently deceased (or the
still living) are labor-intensive for a different reason-the likelihood
of an extraordinary abundance of material. Letter writing is undergoing a rapid decline, it is true. But more copies are made of those letters that are written, so loss is less likely. And people are leaving their
traces in all sorts of other recoverable forms, ranging from e-mail and
videotapes to oral histories and library depositories of personal papers. And if acquaintances of the subject survive, there is much interviewing to be done.
17 W.H. Auden, In Memory of W.B. Yeats, in The Collected Poetry of W.H. Auden 48,
50 (1945).
18 See, e.g., Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry 183 (1947) (discussing "perils of biographical bias" in interpreting W.B. Yeats's
"Among School Children"); W.K. Wimsatt, Jr., The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning
of Poetry 3-18, 19 (1954); cf. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood
Relation 218-27 (1988) (comparing legislative interpretation and New Critics' view of interpreting literature).
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Time is money for people who write for a living. For academics,
the cost of time takes a slightly different form-the forgoing of other
scholarly projects. Tme is a finite resource that must be allocated
across potential projects. Anyone who is trying to decide whether to
write a biography must, therefore, weigh the enormous investment of
time that will be required against the likely rewards, financial or
otherwise. The financial rewards are limited to biographies of the famous or the notorious. The obscurely great, or non-great, are unlikely
to find biographers anywhere but in the universities. An academic
must consider carefully what he is giving up by devoting years to doing the research for, and writing, a biography, given the uncertainty of
the contribution that biography makes to knowledge and the alternative uses for his time. In the time that Gerald Gunther took to write
his 818-page biography of Learned Hand (about which more later), he
might have written twenty (or probably more) law review articles
averaging forty pages, and conceivably the contribution to legal scholarship would have been greater. Of course benefits to scholarship are
not, and should not be, the only consideration in decisions about a
career; the taste of the scholar is an important consideration. If
Gunther got a kick out of writing the biography that he would not
have gotten from writing its weight in articles, as he must have
thought when he embarked, this is something to be added into the
cost-benefit calculation, and likewise the fact that biographies can be
expected to have a longer "shelf life"-to remain in print longer and
be read longer-than an essay or (nonbiographical) book about the
same person. Because biographies are so costly to write, fewer biographies will be written about a person than essays and nonbiographical books. The biographies will be spaced farther apart in time and as
a result will not be superseded so quickly as the other types of writing
about the subject of the biography.
The high cost of biography is the principal explanation for the
practice of granting a biographer exclusive access to the private papers of his subject. Exclusivity performs a function similar to that of
patents. A scholar or writer may be unwilling to invest a huge amount
of his time in doing a biography if he has no assurance that his work
cannot be duplicated before he has had a chance to recoup some of his
costs (in time lost to other projects) through the publication and sale
of a book for which there is no close substitute.
An important consideration in deciding whether to write a biography is the existence of alternative genres to biography.' 9 These are
19 See, e.g., J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Judicial Biography and the Behavioral Persuasion, 65 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 704, 704-09 (1971).
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substitute projects not only for the biographer but also for readers.
The better these substitutes, the smaller will be the supply of and the
demand for standard biography. Indeed, by the term "alternative
genres" I simply mean studies that offer themselves as substitutes for
biography-works that strive to attain the aims, or some of them, of
biography at a lower cost in time and perhaps with a stronger claim to
truth. Examples of the alternative genres are brief lives (by Plutarch,
Aubrey, Johnson, Strachey, and others); biographical studies that confine themselves to the most momentous years of the subject's life or
that focus even more narrowly on specific crises or turning points in
that life; group biographies (more likely of course to be biographical
sketches, "profiles," so as to fit within one cover);20 interpretive essays
that seek to "explain" a historical figure; studies of a person's works
with only incidental reference to his life; oral histories-autobiography midwifed by a historian; and aggregative comparative studies. By
the last I mean works like the Goertzels', 21 which try to discover the
springs of creativity inductively by comparing the frequency with
which certain traits are found in creative people with the frequency of
those traits in the population as a whole. The sampling of three hundred lives in one book seems a more efficient method of studying people's lives than three hundred biographies-until one realizes that the
Goertzels could not have gotten to first base without the biographers,
for it was the biographers who generated the data (and indeed furnished the sample) on which the Goertzels' study was based.
II
So: a problematic and costly genre, the biography, and nowhere
is this truer than in judicial biography.2 All the problems of general
biography, and of literary biography, are present, exacerbated by additional problems.
2 See, e.g., Strachey, supra note 4, which remains the most famous example of this
genre. A distinguished example in law is G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradltion: Profiles of Leading American Judges (1976).
21 Mildred G. Goertzel et al., Three Hundred Eminent Personalities: A Psychosocial
Analysis of the Famous (1978). The criterion for inclusion in the Goertzels' list was to
have been the subject of at least one biography since 1962. For other examples of this
genre, see Dean K. Simonton, Greatness: Who Makes History and Why (1994), and
Howard Gardner, The Creators' Patterns, in Changing the World: A Framework for the
Study of Creativity 69 (David H. Feldman et al. eds., 1994). For a hybrid of this genre and
group biography, see Howard Gardner, Creating Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity Seen

Through the Lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Gandhi at x
(1993).

22 1 am not, of course, the first to have noted this. See Howard, supra note 19, at 70507; Walter F. Murphy, Populist in the Pulpit, 78 Yale L.J. 725, 728 (1969) (reviewing
J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Mr. Justice Murphy: A Political Biography (1968)).
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The aims of judicial biography are variousP just as with other
biographical writing. The scaffolding aim is prominent, especially, but
not only, in biographies of recent Supreme Court Justices, an example
being the recent biography of Lewis Powell.24 In these biographies,
the author's interest appears to be almost entirely in the workings of
the Supreme Court as illuminated by the Justice's private papers
(abundant only in the case of recent Justices), unless the Justice happens to be a person of exceptional qualities, which is rarely the case,
or lived an exciting life, which is even more rare. Biographies of early
Justices, from Marshall to Fuller, often turn out to be histories of the
Supreme Court during the subject's tenure. Perhaps these should not
be regarded as biographies at all, but as works of an alternative genre.
The more recent the Justice, the more likely the biography is to provide a vehicle for expounding the biographer's judicial philosophy-to
be, in short, ideological.
The recent biography of Hugo Black2 maintains a good balance
between the subject's pre-Supreme Court years and his Court years.
But while it is a good read and a mine of interesting information, it is
not a critical or analytic work. It is adulatory and slightly breathless.
Such a book, which comes closest to general biographies written for
popular audiences, caters mainly to the public's curiosity about the
personalities and private lives of the powerful.
A notable exception to my generalizations about biographies of
Supreme Court Justices is Laura Kalman's biography of Abe Fortas, 6
a rare, perhaps unique, example of an edifying judicial biography.
Kalman's book is in the tradition of medieval cautionary tales of the
mutability of worldly fortune. Fortas had a meteoric rise followed by
an even more meteoric fall due, as Kalman skillfully and unobtrusively demonstrates, to the arrogance, pride, loss of touch, overconfidence, closed-mindedness, and lack of self-knowledge that are the
occupational hazards of the highly successful. It is the only judicial
biography known to me that can be recommended to judges and lawyers as a warning not to stray too far from the paths of virtue,
humility, and prudence.
23 For useful lists, see J.W. Peltason, Supreme Court Biography and the Study of Public
Law, in Essays on the American Constitution 215, 217-19 (Gottfried Dietze ed., 1964);

Murphy, supra note 22, at 728-29. Murphy was describing the benefits of "well-done" biographies in his review of what is widely considered the most successful biography of a
Supreme Court Justice, Howard's biography of Justice Murphy, supra note 22.
24 John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (1994). An older example is Fowler
V. Harper, Justice Rutledge and the Bright Constellation (1965).
25 Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography (1994).
26 Laura J. Kalman, Abe Fortas: A Biography (1990).
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Few judges, however prominent, have been extraordinary individuals;27 few have led interesting lives; few have had Fortas's Luciferlike fall from grace. Satisfying the reading public's curiosity about the
great, or about the fascinating, is rarely a motive for a judicial biography. I have mentioned one exception-Newman's biography of Hugo
Black. The principal exception, however, is the biographies of
Holmes, a judge of towering greatness who, in addition, lived an interesting life and left a huge mass of public and private papers to sift
through. Biographies of Hohnes2s try to locate his essential self in the
thousands of pages of and about him (mostly of). Their failure is one
reason for my skepticism concerning the existence of the essential self.
Hand, 29 and Hirsch for
Gunther has tried to do the same for Learned
30
Felix Frankfurter in a psychobiography.
The most common type of judicial biography is the ideological.
Judges are presented as standing for a judicial philosophy that the biographer either approves or (rarely) disapproves. Gunther's biography of Hand is a recent example. 31 Scientific judicial biographiesbiographies that try to identify causal relations, for example between
what a judge read and the judicial opinions that he wrote-are rare.
The most pawed-over causal issue in judicial biography has been
whether and in what direction Holmes's three years' service in the
Civil War, in which he was wounded three times, each time seriously,
influenced his judicial philosophy. There is endless speculation, but
no satisfactory answer. It is plausible to attribute the "hard" side visible in so many of his opinions to his brutal experiences in wartime, but
is it right? Many of his contemporaries who had no military experience were equally "hard," a good example being Holmes's English
friend James Fitzjames Stephen. 32
Because the principal output of judges, especially appellate
judges (and biographies of trial judges are rare), consists of judicial
opinions, judicial biography is a cousin of literary biography. The relation is particularly close for those who believe, as do I, that literary
distinction is a central element in the reputation of the great judges,
27 Reviewing biographies of Earl Warren, Dennis J. Hutchinson concluded, with impolitic candor, "he was a dull man and a dull judge." Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief:
Earl Warren and the Supreme Court, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 922, 930 (1983).
28 Of which there are now a goodly number. See generally John F. Hagemann, Looking at Holmes: A Review Essay, 39 S.D. L. Rev. 433 (1994).
29 See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge at ix, xvii-xviii (1994),
30 See Harry N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter at ix (1981).

31 See Gunther, supra note 29, at xviii ("I began work on this biography despite the
fear that my admiration might preclude an absolutely unprejudiced portrayal ....
remains my idol still.").
32

See my essay on Stephen in Posner, supra note 10, at 259-70.
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such as Holmes, Cardozo, and Hand. This makes the disconnection
between inner self and literary expression almost as serious a problem
for judicial biography as for literary biography. We have some clues,
if nothing more, to where these judges got their judicial philosophies,
but we have no idea what it was in these judges or their environments
that can explain their literary distinction. Their education was not significantly different from that of other judges, who wrote with no literary distinction, yet some of those other judges, such as William
Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes, were men of formidable intellect. Emphasis on personality has done unwarranted damage to the
reputation of Felix Frankfurter, an extremely accomplished judge. We
find it hard to accept that jerk and genius are often found in the same
33
body.
Yet if the literary dimension of judicial performance complicates
judicial biography in one sense, its increasing absence complicates it in
another. Today, few judges, even the most famous (William Brennan
being a notable example), write their own opinions or speeches. The
writing is delegated, often with very little supervision, to law clerks;
sometimes even the selection of the law clerks is delegated. Increasingly, judicial output is a corporate affair (it always was, in a more
limited sense, because of the heavy reliance that most judges place on
the briefs of the parties). The biographies of modem judges may
come to resemble histories of General Motors or the New York Public
Library. This is another reason to doubt whether judicial biography
has a bright future as a distinct genre.
The special problems of judicial biography can be brought into
focus by asking who can be expected to be the authors and who the
readers of such biography. The answer to both questions is: mainly
lawyers. Few others are interested in reading about the lives of
judges, because judges, with just a tiny handful of exceptions, are obscure and forbidding figures to the public at large. If the readership of
judicial biography is to be composed largely of lawyers, there is a certain logic to the authors' being lawyers as well: the better to communicate with the primary audience for the work. In addition, it is very
difficult for a nonlawyer to write a judicial biography. This is not only
because judges deal with technical legal issues but also because the
role of the judge is difficult for nonlawyers to understand. Nonlawyers tend either to be credulous about judges' self-serving rhetoric of
disinterest or to assume that judges are merely politicians ("states33 Cf. George Orwell, Benefit of Clergy:. Some Notes on Salvador Dali, in 3 The Col-

lected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell 156, 161 (Sonia Orwell & Ian
Angus eds., 1968).
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men," if the nonlawyer shares the judge's politics) in disguise, whereas
the truth usually lies somewhere in the middle.
It is true that a number of well-known biographies of Supreme
34
Court Justices, beginning with Beveridge's life of John Marshall,
have been written by nonlawyers. But the results are certainly mixed.
An example is Alpheus Thomas Mason's biography of Harlan Fiske
Stone.3 5 As Philip Kurland has demonstrated, Mason's biography
does not show Stone as he was but as he would have liked the public
to think that he was.3 6 Mason turned out to be a gullible member of

that public.
Judges are great bluffers, and it is particularly difficult for
nonlawyers to penetrate the bluff unless they are highly cynical. It is
possible to be too cynical even about the legal profession, but lawyers
don't generally do much better in piercing the facade, though for a
different reason. Deference to judges is deeply ingrained in the legal
culture. This is partly because judges have power over lawyers
(elected judges have less power over lawyers, and are deferred to by
them less), and partly because, like any guild or profession, lawyers
tend to close ranks against outsiders. The probity and intelligence of
judges are central figures in the "official" picture of the law that lawyers paint for laymen. Even when writing biography, lawyers are reluctant to foul the nest by depicting judges as they really are. Then,
too, the relation of lawyers to truth is an ambivalent one, making
them particularly unreliable practitioners of a craft-the writing of biography-that itself bears a questionable relation to truth. Lawyers
are skilled equivocators, and are more comfortable defending a "position" than finding out the way things really are. So it comes naturally
to the lawyer-biographer to write a brief for his subject. These things
are truer of practicing lawyers than of law professors, and it is from
the ranks of the latter rather than the former that most judicial biographers come.37 But few law professors are able and inclined to shed
entirely the outlook of the lawyer they were trained to be.
34 1-2 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall (1916); 3-4 Albert J.Beveridge,
The Life of John Marshall (1919).
35 Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (1956).
36 Philip B. Kurland, Book Review, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1321 (1957) (reviewing
Mason, supra note 35); see also J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Alpheus T. Mason and the Art of
Judicial Biography, 8 Const. Commentary 41, 48-49 (1991). The problem of a biographer
identifying with his subject is of course not limited to judicial biography, let alone judicial
biography by nonlawyers. Cf. Eva Schepeler, The Biographer's Transference: A Chapter
in Psychobiographical Epistemology, 13 Biography 111 (1990).
37 Though one of the better judicial biographies was written by a practicing lawyer. See
Willard L. King, Melville Weston Fuller: Chief Justice of the United States 1888-1920
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1967) (1950).
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The more a lawyer is a true believer in the legal profession's official (still widely believed, and even more widely propagated) view of
law, the less likely he is to think that writing a judicial biography is a
worthwhile undertaking. In the most extreme versions of legal formalism, the judge is an oracle or a computing machine; his personality, life history, values, family, and politics do not enter into his
decisions at all and, it would seem to follow, are therefore not very
interesting. What I am calling the problem of disconnection is then at
its most acute. No lawyer is that formalistic today. And one can imagine a formalist biography the very point of which is that the judge's
life had not influenced the outcome of his decisions; some might find a
hint of this theme in Gunther's biography of Hand. Yet in general, as
one moves from the formalist pole toward the realist (or, nowadays,
the "crit") pole, the attraction of biography as a mode of explaining
judicial decisions grows. Phil Neal has pointed out that one reason for
an interest in writing and reading biographies of Supreme Court Justices is that we doubt that their decisions are fully determined by the
rules of law; we think that personal factors must play a significant
role.38 Oddly, the legal realists did not write judicial biographies. The
crits, too, have shown very little interest in the lives of judges. (One
reason may be that their judicial heroes would not bear close scrutiny.) The supply, among lawyers anyway, of good judicial biographers is apt to remain small.
A relevant consideration in appraising the prospects for judicial
biographies written by lawyers is that the writing of biography is a
particularly costly undertaking for academic, as for other, lawyers.
Law schools are not oriented to the demands of time-consuming
scholarly projects, because historically and even today few law professors have had the taste or training for such projects. Law professors
do not have cadres of graduate students to assist them, though they
can get some help from law students; they have, many of them, heavy
teaching loads; they are constantly being dragooned into university
governance activities, for which their lawyerly talents particularly
equip them; and they are easily tempted from their academic duties by
opportunities for engaging in legal consulting, public service, and
other "real world" extracurricular activities. The distractions that beset law professors are part of the explanation for the extraordinary
delay in the appearance of biographies of major judges by law professors. Mark DeWolfe Howe died before he could finish his biography
of Holmes and was followed to his grave by his designated successor,
Grant Gilmore; the Hand biography was published thirty years after it
38

Phil C. Neal, Introduction to id. at vii.
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was commissioned; law professors' biographies of Brandeis, Cardozo,
Frankfurter, and Jackson have yet to appear, although the Cardozo
biography (by Andrew Kaufman-forty years in the making) is due
out soon.
Worst of all, nothing in a lawyer's or legal scholar's training and
experience equips him to write biography. He is not trained to write
narratives or to depict human beings empathetically; few academic
lawyers, even those with experience as law clerks, have demonstrated
an ability to imagine what being a judge feels like. In one sense a
weak faculty of empathy does not matter with respect to the most
popular subject for judicial biography, Holmes. His biographies are
essentially written out of his letters and judicial opinions. The empathetic observer is Holmes himself. But in another sense, a lack of
empathy is a serious impediment to the writing of an adequate biography of Holmes. His outlook has proved deeply antipathetic to most of
his biographers. He is not "politically correct." He is not the patient
judicial craftsman of legend. He is not entirely consistent. He does
not seem entirely likeable. He wrote so much, yet so determinedly
concealed his "inner self," that it is hard to get a handle on him. Read
in great swatches, he becomes a little tedious. And his intellectual
breadth exceeds that of his biographers. The biographers thus have
trouble encompassing him, yet at the same time feel compelled constantly to apologize for him. The Novick 39 and White 40 biographies
are works of distinction, yet there is a sense that the definitive biography of Holmes has not been written, and perhaps never will be.
The case of Holmes is special. The general challenge of judicial
biography, to which few judicial biographers rise, is to write empathetically and arrestingly about dullish people who are not introspective.
That is an art. The writing of a biography requires great diligence and
patience, which many academic lawyers have, but diligence and patience are not enough to produce a first-rate biography.
If dull people make for dull biographies, a focus on the handful of
exciting judges (led by Holmes) becomes the inevitable focus of judicial biography. But if, as I have assumed throughout this paper, the
primary use of judicial biography is to illuminate the judicial process,
a focus on the handful of exciting judges is apt to create a distorted
impression of that process. Most judge-made law is made by the ordinary judge, not the extraordinary one. 41 Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo,
Hand, and a handful of other judges may well be each of them far
39
40
41

Sheldon M. Novick, Honorable Justice: The Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes (1989).
White, supra note 16.
See Posner, supra note 10, at 109-10.
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more influential than any judges outside of that charmed circle, but
the aggregate contribution of the run-of-the-mill judges to the shape
of our law is much greater than that of the charmed circle, because of
the incremental nature of judge-made law and the vastly greater
number of ordinary than extraordinary judges.
The result of all the obstacles to good biography in general and to
good, useful judicial biography in particular is that most judicial biographies really do not deserve the name and that even the best are not
completely satisfactory. I will illustrate the first point with Charles
Fairman's biography of Samuel F. Miller,4 2 who served on the
Supreme Court in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and the
second with Gunther's biography of Hand. The title of Fairman's biography is significant. He substitutes a title for the man's first name
(known to few lawyers even) and makes all too clear that the only
thing that interests him about Miller is his long service on the
Supreme Court during a tumultuous period in the Court's history.
Miller never comes alive. The impression conveyed, seemingly unintentionally, is of a pompous ass, energetic and well-meaning but mediocre in intellect and thoroughly conventional in outlook. Dickens
could make a conceited ass interesting. Fairman could not. The writing is stilted and full of respectful gestures toward the Court and its
members. It is writing by and for the guild.
King's biography of another Supreme Court old-timer, Chief Justice Melville Fuller 4 3 is better written than Fairman's book and paints
a lively picture of a nice man, though a lesser judicial figure than
Miller. Fairman was a distinguished scholar; King was not a scholar at
all, and Fairman had an abler subject and a more interesting period to
write about. But King's is a genuine biography, and Fairman's is a
slice of Supreme Court history garnished with quotations from the not
very interesting private letters of one of its not very interesting
members.
I have written a review of Gunther's biography of Learned Hand
and do not want to repeat what I said there. 44 But no contemporary
discussion of judicial biography would be complete without some
mention of Gunther's book. The thoroughness of his research, extending over decades, the superb writing and organization, the distinction of the author in the legal academic community, and the intrinsic
42

Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court 1862-1890 (1939).

43 King, supra note 37.
44 See Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial

Greatness, 104 Yale LJ. 511, 520 (1994) (book review). Or what Judge Boudin said in his
excellent-and more generous-review. See Michael Boudin, The Master Craftsman, 47
Stan. L. Rev. 363, 386 (1995) (book review).
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importance of his subject have made the publication of the book an
event in the history of judicial biography. Gunther has set a standard
against which all subsequent judicial biographies will be judged.
Yet despite its excellence, the book has serious limitations. One
is its ideological cast, which carries Gunther away from the true significance of Learned Hand's career. Gunther, a constitutional scholar,
wishes to make Hand a spokesman for self-restraint in constitutional
adjudication. Although Hand wrote a few notable constitutional
opinions and gave a series of lectures on constitutional interpretation,
the vast bulk of his judicial career was devoted to statutory and common law cases rather than to constitutional ones. It is in those areas,
not constitutional law, that he made an enduring mark on American
law and earned the reputation of the greatest lower-court judge in
American history. Yet they receive short shrift in Gunther's long
book as a result of their remoteness from the theme of judicial selfrestraint that preoccupies him because of his extrabiographical interests and commitments.
As with all ideological biographies, the author's desire to make
his subject stand for (or against) an ideal causes some trimming of
rough edges. The Hand portrayed by Gunther is a pretty rough diamond; the actual diamond was even rougher. I don't think this matters much. A related but more serious problem with the Hand
biography, which a deeper or franker confrontation with Hand's foibles would only have magnified, is the disconnection that I have been
emphasizing between the inner self and the outer achievement. 45 The
insecurity, the rudeness, the orneriness, the uxoriousness, the ambition, the emotionality, the neuroticism that characterized Hand the
person are not visible in the judicial opinions. Although Gunther attempts to relate the skepticism that he finds at the root of Hand's
philosophy of judicial self-restraint to Hand's personal insecurities,
the attempt founders on the familiar problem of biographical causality-the difficulty of verifying counterfactuals. Hand got his philosophy of judicial self-restraint from Holmes, who seems to have had
none of Hand's insecurities. It could nevertheless be that insecurity is
a sufficient but not a necessary condition of being a restrained judge.
Could be, but is not, for it would be easy to make a list of judicial
activists who were personally insecure.
Gunther's desire to use Hand to make a point about the importance of judicial self-restraint may have been a factor in Gunther's
45 A similar point is made in Kannar's superb review of Hirsch's psychobiography of

Frankfurter. George Kannar, Representative Egos, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 875, 901
(1982) (reviewing Hirsch, supra note 30).
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decision to try to reach a large audience by publishing with a commercial press, a decision that in turn entailed an effort at "humanizing"
the subject by downplaying his technical work as a lower-court judge.
As a result we do not learn a great deal (in an 818-page book!) about
the judicial process. Indeed, we do not discover wherein Hand was a
great judge and, unless we accept facile psychologizing, what made
him great. But I acknowledge that this may be an insider's complaint.
We know that the public is avid for biography, and it can be argued
therefore that judicial biography affords a rare opportunity for informing the lay public about law. Catherine Drinker Bowen's two
widely read "popularizing" judicial biographies-Yankee from Olympus,46 about Holmes, and The Lion and the Throne,47 about Cokecan be seen, in this light, as significant contributions to public enlightenment about law. Novick's biography of Holmes and Gunther's of
Hand may have a similar significance, in addition to their undoubted
scholarly merits.
It is a curious property of judicial biography that the more political the judge, the more illuminating the biography is likely to be.
Hugo Black was a highly political Supreme Court Justice. Appointed
to the Court from the United States Senate, where he had been notable for his partisanship, Black was hardly likely to be otherwise than
political, and he was not. He was an intelligent person, an able lawyer, and a graceful writer, but au fond he really was a politician in
robes; the stamp he placed on the Constitution was an entirely personal one. Newman's biography identifies some aspects of personality
and life experiences that shaped Black's political outlook and by doing so helps explain why Black was the kind of Supreme Court Justice
that he was.48 Newman's approach would not get far with a Holmes, a
Hand, or a Cardozo. That is not because these judges' decisions were
not influenced by extralegal knowledge and experience; it is because
we are interested in much more than their votes on particular cases
and because even those votes cannot be mapped onto a simple pattern
of political preferences. Brandeis is an intermediate case, a judge far
more thoughtful, learned, and disciplined than Black, yet also more
influenced4 9 by political or ideological passion than Holmes, Hand, or
Cardozo.

46 Catherine D. Bowen, Yankee from Olympus: Justice Holmes and His Family (1943).
47 Catherine D. Bowen, The Lion and the Throne (1956).
48 Newman, supra note 25, at 3-121.
49

See generally infra notes 58, 61.
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III
The serious, and seemingly inherent, obstacles to successful judicial biography make the issue of alternative genres a particularly urgent one. There is no dearth of these. Since what is interesting about
judges is mainly their opinions and their votes (and sometimes their
behind-the-scenes influence), the obvious alternative to studying the
judge's life is studying his opinions, philosophy, style, legacy, and influence. Each of the famous judges has accreted a large commentary
of this sort-so large a commentary that the question of what a biography could add to the understanding and critique of the judge qua
judge is a legitimate and not merely impertinent one. The insightful
essays on Holmes's jurisprudence by Thomas Grey,50 G. Edward
White, 51 and others tell us more about Holmes than the biographies
do.5 2 It is noteworthy that of the four sessions of this conference on
judicial biography, two-"Biographies of Titans: Holmes, Brandeis,
and Other Obsessions" and "Members of the Warren Court in Judicial
Biography"-barely touched on biography. The first was concerned
with the sociology of reputation 53 (why have Holmes and Brandeis in
particular earned such huge reputations?) and the second with the
evaluation, not biography, of the members of the Supreme Court during Chief Justice Warren's tenure.
Since appellate judges decide cases as a committee, an especially
attractive alternative to the conventional judicial biography is the
study of the membership of a court at a particular point or interval in
its history. A distinguished example of this genre is Schick's book on
the Second Circuit during the period when Learned Hand was chief
judge.5 4 This book, nastily criticized by Henry Friendly when it was
published, 55 is essentially ignored by Gunther (though he does cite it),
50 Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 787 (1989).
51 G. Edward White, The Integrity of Holmes' Jurisprudence, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 633
(1982).
52 Professor Howard in his comment on this paper discusses some of the alternative
genres to judicial biography. See J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Commentary, 70 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 533, 543-46 (1995). He is himself the author not only of a notable biography of Justice
Murphy, Howard, supra note 22, but also of a notable alternative study of the judicial
system, J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System: A
Study of the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits (1981) [hereinafter Howard,
Courts of Appeals].
53 This is a central theme of my book, Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 58-69 (1990) (examining nature of reputation and how it is affected by merit, exploitation, accident, and politics).
54 Marvin Schick, Learned Hand's Court (1970).
55 Henry J. Friendly, Book Review, 86 Pol. Sci. Q. 470 (1971). The tone of the review is
set in the first two sentences:
In an access of modesty Marvin Schick questions in his preface whether, in
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even though it deals with important aspects of Hand's work as a judge
in greater depth than does Gunther's book. A number of things, I
conjecture, offended Friendly (and perhaps Gunther) about Schick's
fine work. First is Schick's less than reverential, although highly respectful and on the whole highly positive, evaluation of Hand as a
judge. Second is his suggestion that Hand's court contained "liberals"
and "conservatives" and that the balance between the two wings determined the outcome of some cases. Third is Schick's willingness to
wash the court's dirty linen in public (albeit a tiny public), by exposing
the infantile feud between two of its members, Jerome Frank and
Charles Clark. Fourth is a taste for quantification (though this receives the grudging approval of Judge Friendly), as in the series of
tables in which Schick reports each judge's "scorecard" of affirmances
and reversals by the Supreme Court, and shows that "liberal" Second
Circuit judges and "liberal" Supreme Court Justices tended to vote
the same way, and the "conservatives" on both courts likewise. Last is
the presumptuousness of a social scientist's undertaking to evaluate
judges. Schick's sins against the legal establishment were thus many:
failing to worship at the shrine of a judicial saint; treating the judicial
process as politicized and personalized; presuming that a nonlawyer
can pass judgment on respected members of the legal profession; and
reducing cases to statistics. Friendly remarks revealingly that if the
reader skips roughly the first two-thirds of the book and skims much
of the remainder, "the book can be palatable to aficionados of the
Second Circuit in its great days." 56 Should this be the criterion of
scholarship about judges?
We need more books like Schick's and fewer judicial biographies.
We learn a lot about the judicial process from Schick's book (not least
how it is viewed from outside law), which is why most of us, judges or
lawyers, would read a judicial biography. We do not learn much
about the judicial process from biographies-except, as I have suggested, in the case of judges who really are politicians in disguise. In
the case of the great judges, like Holmes and Hand, we may feel that
we are getting near the inner man, but it is not clear that it is the inner
man who writes the judicial opinions that drew us to the biography in
the first place. Biography is a costly genre, and there is not such a
plenitude of first-rate legal scholarship as should make us complacent
about the many years of scholarly time that have been lost to the comniques used by political scientists, he has "succeeded to the satisfaction of

either." As a lawyer I can confirm his doubts; my guess is that political scientists also will share them.
Id. at 470 (citation omitted).
56 Id. at 476.
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position of judicial biographies. The natural curiosity that we judges,
at any rate, have about the lives of other judges is satisfied by bio57
graphical essays, of which there are many.
Schick's approach is only one alternative to biography as a way of
studying judges. The focus can remain on the individual judge rather
than on his court, yet it can be the judge's work that is studied rather
than his life. 58 The quantitative approach is important and should be
expanded to include the study of patterns of judicial and scholarly citations to the opinions of the judge or judges being studied.5 9 And if
one wanted to study the effects of race and gender on judicial performance, a quantitative study using race and gender as explanatory
variables would produce more objective results than biographies of
individual black or female judges.
No evaluative study of an individual judge is complete until his
opinions are compared with the lawyers' briefs. 60 This is necessary in
order to determine not only the judge's "value added" but also his
scrupulousness with respect to the facts of record and the arguments
of the parties. It is also important to determine so far as possible what
the judge read-because what a person reads, and doesn't read,
shapes his outlook, style, and philosophy-and, more broadly, to determine how the judge informed himself about what was going on in
the world about him.61 When the judge who is being written about is
an appellate judge, an assessment ought to be made of his colleagues,
because the performance of an appellate judge is both enhanced and
constrained by them. Hand benefited from having unusually good
colleagues; Holmes complained about the overediting of his opinions
by his colleagues. The heft and composition of the caseload of the
judge's court is important, too, as is the method by which cases were
assigned in his court. For judges active in the modern era of ghost57 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Benchmarks 291-307, 308-17, 318-24 (1967); Charles E.
Wyzanski, Jr., Augustus Noble Hand, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 573, 573-91 (1948). My personal
favorite among the works in this genre is Edmund Wilson's great essay on Holmes in his
book, Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War 743-96 (1962).
58 For a notable recent example, see Stephen W. Baskerville, Of Laws and Limitations:
An Intellectual Portrait of Louis Dembitz Brandeis 227-74 (1994); cf. David F. Bryden,
Brandeis's Facts, 1 Const. Commentary 281 (1984).
59 I tried to do this with Cardozo in my book, see Posner, supra note 53, at 74-91, and
with Hand in my review of Gunther's biography, see Posner, supra note 44, at 536 tbl. 1; cf.
Howard, Courts of Appeals, supra note 52, at 143-45. I believe such a quantitative approach is never taken in judicial biographies.
60 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 53, at 111-12 (noting that minimal resemblance of
Cardozo's opinions to lawyers' briefs attests to his ample creativity). This is rarely if ever
done in judicial biographies.
61 This is not a new idea. See, e.g., Lynford A. Lardner, Judges as Students of American Society, 24 Ind. LJ. 386, 389-90 (1949); cf. Baskerville, supra note 58, at 274.
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writing by law clerks, an attempt must be made to separate the judge's
work from that of his ghosts; the polite fiction that all judges are the
authors of their opinions must be dropped. The failure to do this
reduces the value of biographies of Powel 62 and other contemporary
judges.
In short, for full-scale judicial biographies I impertinently propose the substitution of judicial studies that will employ a range of
legal, humanistic, and social-scientific techniques. Many, I expect,
will be collaborative projects of law professors and professors from
other fields. I believe that studies of the kind I have suggested, studies
instanced by Schick's book on Hand and his colleagues and by
Baskerville's recent book on Brandeis,63 hold greater promise for illuminating the judicial process than judicial biographies do-and only
part of the reason is that such studies can be conducted in less time
than required for a full-length judicial biography. But I am speaking
of scholarly illumination, and it is arguable that the judicial biography
has an especially important role to play in explaining law to lay
people.

62 See Jeffries, supra note 24.
63 See Baskerville, supra note 58.
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